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Abstract
The paper estimates a social interactions model to study the im-
pact of culture on US immigrants’ decisions. The paper contributes
to the literature as follows. It first estimates a social interactions
model of peer effects that models both group formation and the for-
mation of social interactions. In addition, because it is an observa-
tional learning model, policy suggestions may be drawn to favor inte-
gration of immigrants. Finally, it provides a new empirical strategy
to study the impact of both inherited and contemporaneous culture
on individual decisions. Findings vary by group of immigrants and
by type of social interactions, and they are robust to both additional
checks and sensitivity analysis.
∗Marini: University of Exeter, Streatham Court, Rennes Drive, EX4 4PU, Exeter,
UK, a.marini@exeter.ac.uk. This paper is a revised version of an idea I developed during
my PhD at the University of Bristol. I am very grateful to Steven Durlauf for comments
and suggestions. I am also thankful to Sonia Bhalotra, Gregory Jolivet, Aureo de Paula,
Fabien Postel-Vinay, John Temple, Frank Windmeijer, and the audiences at the Univer-
sity of Bristol, University of Exeter, and University of Pennsylvania. The responsibility
for the content of the paper is entirely mine. I acknowledge financial support from the
Worldwide University Network at the University of Bristol for the visiting period at the
University of Wisconsin-Madison. While working on the paper during the period I was
at University of Pennsylvania, I received financial support from the John Templeton
Foundation. The opinions expressed in this publication are mine and do not necessar-
ily reflect the views of the John Templeton Foundation. I have no relevant or material
financial interests that relate to the research described in this paper.
1
“Everybody blames the culture without taking responsibility.”-
J.L. Levine, American Musician
“Trusting is good but not trusting is better.”- Italian Proverb
“In God we trust.”- Statement on the American Bank Notes
1 Introduction
Social interactions models are of interest to economists because they allow
investigation of the importance of peer effects, herding behavior, and so-
cial capital on individual behavior (Zanella, 2007). The literature has made
several contributions towards identifying social interactions and peer effects
(Brock and Durlauf, 2001a, 2006; Zanella, 2007; Graham, 2008; Blume et al.,
2011; Kasy, 2015) and empirically assessing (e.g., Hoxby, 2000; Sacerdote,
2001; De Giorgi, Pellizzari and Redaelli, 2010) their importance for indi-
vidual behavior. Following the social interactions literature (Brock and
Durlauf, 2006; Zanella, 2007; Blume et al., 2011), this paper estimates a
social interactions model of peer effects that models both sorting of indi-
viduals and the formation of social interactions, thus providing an empirical
framework for identifying social interactions in discrete choice models. The
framework can be applied to a broad range of topics; I use it to estimate
US immigrants’ decisions in order to provide an intuitive application of the
theory that could also be of general interest.
What factors explain the sorting of immigrants in a region? And once
they decide to live in a region, who among them trusts others and what
affects their behavioral decisions? When individuals decide to move and
migrate to a region of another country, they should also decide whether
to conform to the behavior of individuals living in the host region or to
maintain the behavior they used to have in the country of origin. The
decision of immigrants to integrate or to segregate themselves in the host
country may have socioeconomic consequences. On the one hand, the ability
2
of immigrants to integrate may have positive effects on economic behavior
and performance (Constant and Zimmermann, 2008). On the other hand,
after immigrants settle in a region, they may stick to the behavior they
used to have in their country of origin, base their behavioral decision more
on their interactions with other immigrants (cultural segregation), or adapt
to the behavior of a whole society (cultural assimilation).
Conforming to low-level equilibria may generate social traps (Platt,
1973; Rothstein, 2005), that is, the equivalent of poverty traps when dealing
with social outcomes, which can make self-reinforcing low equilibria diffi-
cult to escape. Thus, understanding the behavior of immigrants is crucial
in a country such as the United States, where certain groups of immigrants
often live in segregated neighboroods, because residential segregation may
reinforce further the presence of social traps.
In this paper, I estimate a social interactions model that models both
the sorting of immigrants and the formation of social interactions. In par-
ticular, I let US immigrants coming from various areas of the world first
choose a low-trust (L-type) or high-trust (H-type) US region (location de-
cision) and then undertake a behavioral decision (whether to trust others)
conditional on the location decision. In the model, immigrants’ decisions are
influenced, among other variables, by the social interactions term, namely,
their expectations about the average level of trust of individuals in a host
region. In so doing, the paper aligns with the social interactions litera-
ture assessing the importance of peer effects and social networks to explain
the existence of segregation and social/poverty traps (Benabou, 1993, 1996;
Durlauf, 1996; Brock and Durlauf, 2001a; Topa, 2001; Zanella, 2007). In
particular, it adds to the recent developments of the literature addressing
selection bias and identification of social interactions (e.g., Graham, 2009;
De Giorgi, Pellizzari and Redaelli, 2010; Pinto, 2015; Kasy, 2015; Kirke-
boen, Leuven and Mogstad, 2016) and it suggests an empirical framework
that permits me to overcome the usual limits of the social interactions mod-
els, namely, the self-selection problem and the reflection problem (Manski,
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1993; Brock and Durlauf, 2006; Zanella, 2007), through modeling. Indeed,
modeling the sorting of immigrants into US regions allows me to model and
control for the self-selection of immigrants. Furthermore, the econometric
assumptions and properties of the model, together with the characteristics
of the data set, allow for solution of other endogeneity problems and the
reflection problem.
However, the paper is distinct from the other papers in the social inter-
actions literature. Similar to De Giorgi, Pellizzari and Redaelli (2010), this
paper provides a general framework for identifying social interactions, but
it differs from their framework in that mine is suitable for nonlinear dis-
crete choice models rather than linear-in-means models; furthermore, the
strategy proposed here does not require knowledge of indirect peer connec-
tions. The identification strategy of this paper also differs from the one in
Graham (2009), who proposes a continuous approach, whereas I propose
an empirical framework based on the literature of discrete choice meth-
ods (Brock and Durlauf, 2006; Zanella, 2007). Graham (2008) works out a
strategy to identify social interactions through conditional variance restric-
tions. Although its method can be extended to models that do not belong
to linear-in-means models under certain conditions, the presence of non-
random assignment is problematic to obtaining identification. By contrast,
the empirical framework proposed here can be applied also to models of
non-random assignment. More recently, Kasy (2015) developed a strategy
to identify social interactions in the presence of sorting. However, for a
variety of reasons his model differs from social interactions models of peer
effects. Finally, unlike other papers, this methodology does not rely on the
use of experiments to recover peer effects (Sacerdote, 2001; Falk and Ichino,
2006; Damm and Dustmann, 2014).
The model presented here also facilitates the investigation of whether
and the extent to which the results are consistent with cultural assimilation
of immigrants and the presence of significant sorting behavior and selection
bias. Additionally, the empirical framework is appealing because the pa-
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rameter that measures the strength of social interactions and its interplay
with private utility may provide suggestions about the possible presence
of multiple equilibria and poverty/social traps (e.g., Brock and Durlauf,
2001b, 2006).
Then, motivated by the fact that immigrants when living in a new coun-
try may be more influenced by the behavior of other immigrants rather
than the entire population, in the second part of the paper, I exploit the
availability of the nationality of immigrants living in the United States in
the General Social Survey (GSS henceforth) data set and I re-estimate the
model using as social interactions terms immigrants’ expectations about the
average level of trust of either immigrants or similar immigrants (i.e., indi-
viduals coming from the immigrant’s area of origin) living in a host region.
By estimating the model on sub-samples of immigrants, I can investigate
whether heterogeneity in behavior exists across them and the possible pres-
ence of cultural segregation. Because I am investigating the behavior of US
immigrants, the presence of cultural segregation could have drastic impli-
cations when combined with residential segregation of immigrants, which is
widely documented in the United States (see Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor,
2008).
Furthermore, the framework allows me to disentangle the impact of both
contemporaneous culture (i.e., the social interactions terms) and inherited
culture (via the difference in trustworthiness between the host region and
the immigrant’s country of origin), which are the two main components
of culture (Bisin and Verdier, 2001; Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Tabellini,
2008b, 2010), on immigrants’ decisions. Thus, the paper also links the mi-
gration literature to the cultural economics literature (Bisin and Verdier,
2001; Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Tabellini, 2010). Existing studies show an
intergenerational transmission of trust exists in children and that individ-
uals are more likely to adjust to low rather than high levels of trust, sug-
gesting depreciation of social capital is easy, though it is more difficult to
build it (Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011; Ljunge, 2014). The paper also refers
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to the studies analyzing the impact of trust on immigrants (e.g., Dinesen,
2012a,b, 2013; Ro¨der and Muhlau, 2011), the presence of acculturation, and
the impact of both inherited culture and the environment on the trust of
immigrants (Dinesen and Hooghe, 2010; Moschion and Tabasso, 2014).
The paper innovates with respect to the previous literature as follows.
First, it is econometrically innovative because it first provides an empirical
framework to estimate a social interactions model of peer effects that models
both group membership and the formation of social interactions. Because
the identification strategy is not specific to the question addressed here, it
can be applied to a broad variety of contexts. In addition, this model is an
observational learning model (Manski, 2000), that is, a model in which in-
dividuals are influenced by other individuals’ beliefs and not by preferences.
Consequently, the empirical analysis may be useful to provide suggestions
for policy-makers, because changes in expectations about other individuals’
behavior could be induced, which could conduct a society out of a social
trap and favor integration of immigrants. Finally, the study suggests a new
empirical strategy to investigate the impact of both the historical compo-
nent of culture (i.e., via the difference in levels of trustworthiness between
the host region and the home country) and its contemporaneous component
(i.e., the social interactions term) on individual decisions.
Results, which are robust to additional checks and a sensitivity analy-
sis, suggest the impact of social interactions terms on immigrants’ decisions
vary both among sub-samples of immigrants and by type of social interac-
tions. In particular, the findings support the existing literature according
to which social capital is easy to depreciate but difficult to build (Nunn and
Wantchekon, 2011; Ljunge, 2014). Furthermore, both inherited trust and
social interactions are relevant to explaining immigrants’ decisions.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the framework
and the data. Section 3 reports the estimation results on the whole sample.
Section 4 reports the results for the sub-samples of immigrants. Section 5
provides a sensitivity analysis and robustness checks; section 6 concludes.
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2 Data and Framework
2.1 Data
The data come from both the World Values Survey (WVS) data set1 and
the GSS data set. Trust of immigrants is obtained from the GSS data set.
The variable used is the following: “Generally speaking, would you say that
most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with
people?” Following the literature (e.g., Tabellini, 2008b), I build a dummy
variable that takes the value of 1 if the answer is that most people can be
trusted, and 0 if the answer is “Can’t be too careful.” By averaging this
indicator for all the individuals living in each region of the GSS, I construct
the yearly average trust for each region, which I use in the analysis as
the term catching the impact of global social interactions on immigrants’
decisions. The second type of social interactions term used in the analysis
is the yearly average trust of immigrants living in the same region, and
the third social interactions term is the yearly average trust of immigrants
coming from the same geographic area.2 These last two terms have been
constructed by averaging the indicator by, respectively, immigrants and
immigrants coming from the same area of the world, who live in a same
host region.
1The former version (2007) of the WVS data set has been used to obtain country
average trustworthiness measures because it is more complete than the latter version
(2014). This last version, the European Values Survey or interpolation, has been used
to integrate the 2007 version of the WVS when needed.
2Social interactions are defined as global when individuals assign the same weight to
the other individuals of the group, and they form their expectations on a large enough
group that they cannot assume to know and interact with every individual in the group
(Brock and Durlauf, 2001a). Thus, all our social interactions terms are likely to be global
rather than local. The interactions with immigrants living in the host region and coming
from the same origin area may be assumed partly local due to strong ties that may link
such immigrants; this scenario is more likely to be true when the reference network is
circumscribed to geographic entities smaller than the macro-regions used in this paper
(e.g., cities). Although more disaggregated data would be available in the GSS, the
number of immigrants by ethnicity per each geographic unit in a precise year and region
would be too small, which could compromise the quality of the results.
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Also, to get the difference in trustworthiness between the host region
and home country, I use the same question for trust present in the WVS,
which gives me the country of origin’s average trustworthiness. Because the
wording of the WVS is the same as for the trust question in the GSS, we
may assume the two sets of averages can be compared. Then the country
of origin’s average trustworthiness is subtracted from the yearly average
trustworthiness of the respective host regions for each group of immigrants.
This allows me to obtain the difference in trustworthiness between the host
region and home country.3 To decide which region is considered an L-type
or an H-type region, I used the yearly regional volunteer rate downloaded
from the National Community Service: a region is considered an H-type
region if the average volunteering rate is higher than the average overall
volunteer rate. I chose this variable as a sorting criterion because the vol-
unteer rate, as a form of civic engagement, is correlated with the level of
trustworthiness in a region. Therefore, modeling the possible presence of
significant (positive or negative) sorting of immigrants is suitable: Individu-
als who are less willing to pay for public goods (or who come from countries
where willingness to pay for public goods is low) may decide to join L-type
regions (e.g., Zanella, 2007). Alternatively, they can rather decide to join
H-type regions because, for instance, in these regions, highly trusted indi-
viduals can be easily cheated (e.g., Butler, Giuliano and Guiso, 2016) or
because they are looking for a better life. Similar reasoning can explain the
positive or negative sorting of individuals who are willing to pay for public
goods. The volunteering rate is also correlated with economic development
and other indicators that could motivate the sorting of immigrants, such as
GDP and employment rate (Putnam, Leonardi and Nanetti, 1993), so it can
also reflect immigrants’ sorting decisions based on one of these indicators.
The construction of the variable for the difference in trustworthiness
between host and home country limits the time framework of the analysis
3I assume that average trust can be considered a measure for trustworthiness in a
region, as assumed by the existing literature (e.g., Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2012).
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to the years available from the WVS: the first wave of the WVS has to be
excluded for lack of data; thus, the regression analysis has to be limited to
the years 1989-2014.
Finally, because the aim of the analysis is to investigate immigrants’ be-
havior, after the computation of regional averages for trust, non-immigrants
have been dropped. After excluding information on immigrants that did
not indicate a specific country, the following countries, representing im-
migrants coming from the economies worldwide, remain: Africa, Austria,
Belgium, Canada, China, Czechoslovakia, Denmark, the United Kingdom,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Mexico,
Netherlands, Norway, Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico (dropped because
not available in the WVS), Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, India, Por-
tugal, Lithuania, Yugoslavia, Romania, and the Americas. Given the small
number of immigrants per each country, in the analysis, immigrants are
grouped according to macro-areas of origin (i.e., Africa, Northern Europe,
Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, Asia, and the Americas) to run the sub-
sample analysis. After these sample restrictions, the data set that can be
used for the empirical analysis is composed of 2,297 (1,475 for the regression
analysis) immigrants. The list of variables, their source, and definitions are
reported in Appendix I (Table A1).
2.2 Empirical Framework
2.2.1 The Model
The analysis is based on a model in which immigrants choose a group/region
(location decision) of the United States, g ∈ (L,H), which can be catego-
rized as an L-type or H-type region, where L < H and L and H, respec-
tively, are the low- and high-trust regions. Once they have chosen where
to migrate, they make a behavioral decision by choosing a certain behavior
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ω ∈ (Liω|g, Hiω|g).4
The estimation strategy is as follows. Drawing on the theoretical liter-
ature of social capital, social interactions, and neighborhood effects models
(e.g. Brock and Durlauf, 2001a, 2002, 2006, 2007; Durlauf, 2002; Durlauf
and Fafchamps, 2005) and its theoretical advances (e.g. Brock and Durlauf,
2006; Zanella, 2007; Blume et al., 2011), the empirical framework is grounded
on a theoretical model of social interactions with endogenous group mem-
bership that can be summarized as in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Individual Decision Tree
Immigrants, who are assumed to be rational, want to maximize their
4Although the trust question may capture actual beliefs, in the cultural economics
literature and when using survey questions, the assumption that individuals are rational
and behave according to their beliefs is common. Thus, we can assume ω captures
the actual behavior of immigrants. Furthermore, although immigrants are born in and
come from economies worldwide, they have been interviewed while they were already
living in the United States. So, we can reasonably assume the absence of substantial
differences in the interpretation of the trust question that could be otherwise addressed
using alternative strategies (e.g., vignettes; see, e.g., King and Wand (2007)). However,
the model accounts for possible further heterogeneity by allowing for the presence of
unobserved heterogeneity.
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utility function, V , as follows:
Max
g,ω
Vi (g, ω) . (1)
They do so by first maximizing the decision regarding which region to join
(g) and subsequently maximizing their behavior conditional on the location
they joined (ωi|g).
In each decision, they choose outcome H only if:
V (H)− V (L) > 0; (2)
that is, they decide to migrate to an H-type region, for instance, if the
expected payoff from joining an H-type region is greater than the expected
payoff from joining an L-type region. Similarly, they decide to trust others
if the payoff (conditional on their location decision) is higher than the payoff
from not trusting others. This framework is suitable for the research ques-
tion addressed in this paper. Indeed, the location decision requires some
degree of individual mobility; whereas some degree of mobility exists among
US natives, investigating the role of inherited and contemporaneous culture
on individuals’ decisions using a sample of immigrants is worthwhile.
Both the location and the behavioral decision are a function of private
utility as well as social utility, so, following the theory of social interac-
tions models (e.g., Brock and Durlauf, 2006; Zanella, 2007), the utility for
individual i can be modeled as follows:
Vi (g, ω) = ν (g, ω, hi) + s
(
g, ω, Jgm
e
ig
)
+ u(uig, uigω), (3)
where ν (·) indicates the deterministic private utility, u (·) indicates the
random private utility, and s (·) indicates social utility. Social interac-
tions models (e.g., Brock and Durlauf, 2006; Zanella, 2007) assume hi =
c + β
′
1Xi + β
′
2Yig, where c is a constant term, Xi represents individual-
specific characteristics, and Yig represents group/region-specific character-
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istics. Jgm
e
ig represents the social interactions term (m
e
ig) and the parameter
that measures its strength (Jg).
I use the “proportional spillovers” specification of social utility that
implies that if an individual expects most of the individuals in a group will
choose ω = 1, the individual has an incentive to conform to the choice of
the majority (Brock and Durlauf, 2001b; Zanella, 2007).
Finally, following Brock and Durlauf (2001b), I assume that in the
model, multiple equilbria may arise when J > 1 and hi is homogeneous,
and this is a baseline of interest.
The maximization of the utility function is represented by the following
optimizations:
gi = arg max
g
(hi + Jm
e
ig + uig) (4)
and
ωi|g = arg max
ω
(hiω + Jgm
e
iωg + uiωg), (5)
sequentially taken by the immigrants. As is conventional in social interac-
tions models (Brock and Durlauf, 2006), I assume immigrants, when form-
ing expectations, do not account for the effect of their own choices on the
decisions of others. I also assume self-consistency to close the model. This
implies the immigrants’ expectations coincide with the objective conditional
probability measure generated by the model (meig = mig).
5
2.2.2 Econometric Framework
Because both the location and behavioral decisions are binary choices, our
framework is similar to the one proposed in Zanella (2007). He derives the
following log-likelihood function:
5I empirically compute the social interactions terms as the average level of trust of the
reference group. By doing so, I assume that, for the law of large numbers, the average
computed on all the individuals and the average computed on all the individuals but the
immigrant making expectations do not differ.
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L =
∑
i
∑
ω
yiω log piω|gi +
∑
i
∑
g
yig log pig, (6)
where yig and yiω are individuals’ choices associated with the respective
latent variables, y∗ig = maxω Vi(g, ω) − maxυ 6=g maxω Vi(ν, ω) and y∗iω|g =
Vi(gi, H)− Vi(gi, L) and
pig =
exp{βbρg + βδ′Yg + βWig}∑
ν
exp{βbρν + βδ′Yν + βWiν}
(7)
piω|g =
exp{aω + c′ωXi + d′ωYg + Jωmg}∑
w
exp{aw + c′wXi + d′wYg + Jwmg} (8)
Wig = log
∑
ω
exp{aω + c′ωXi + d′ωYg + Jωmg}, (9)
where Wig is the inclusive value utility, a is a constant, ρg represents costs
and benefits of living in a region, and c, d, b, δ, and J are parameters. The
author suggests estimating the model by means of a nested logit model.
However, this model is based on strong assumptions. Instead, I estimate
the model by means of a sequential logit model (Maddala, 1983; Mare, 1980;
Buis, 2015), which mainly differs from the nested logit model in that the
first stage choice does not depend on the inclusive value utilities, and it
is more suitable for the framework under study because we can assume
obtaining full information at the first stage about the second stage max-
imization is too costly for the immigrants (see Nagakura and Kobayashi,
2009, for further explanation about the difference between the sequential
and the nested logit model).6 The sequential logit, as the nested logit,
can overcome the problems typical of social interactions models. Indeed,
the reflection problem (Manski,1993), which refers to the impossibility, in
6In a nested logit model, the presence of W , the inclusive value utility that is equal to
the log of the denominator of the lower model, brings information from the second stage
choice into the first stage choice; thus, the model assumes that at the time of making
the first choice, the individual is capable of anticipating the expected utility (s)he will
obtain from the choice in stage two.
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linear-in-means models, of identifying and estimating the parameters of the
model, due to the co-movement of the contextual effects and the social in-
teractions term, is overcome using a nonlinear estimator (e.g., Brock and
Durlauf, 2001b). The self-selection problem, which arises because the model
belongs to the neighborhood models with non-random assignment, where
individuals endogenously choose their group membership, is solved by mod-
eling self-selection, thus controlling for the presence of endogenous sorting
of individuals into groups (Brock and Durlauf, 2006). The likelihood func-
tion can be maximized by maximizing the likelihood function of two binary
logit models (Amemiya, 1985) where the first maximizes the choice of the
location (equation (10)) and the second models the immigrants’ decision to
trust others conditional on the location decision (equations (11) and (12)).
Therefore, the equations estimated in sections 3 and 4 are as follows:
pig =
exp{β10 + β11Xi + β12Yig + β13dtrigr + J1mig}∑
ν
exp{β10 + β11Xi + β12Yig + β13dtrigr + J1mig}
(10)
piω|g=L =
exp{β20 + β21Xi + β22Yig + β23dtrigr + J2mig}∑
w
exp{β20 + β21Xi + β22Yig + β23dtrigr + J2mig}
(11)
piω|g=H =
exp{β30 + β31Xi + β32Yig + β33dtrigr + J3mig},∑
w
exp{β30 + β31Xi + β32Yig + β33dtrigr + J3mig}
(12)
where equation (10) indicates individuals sort into either an H-type region
or an L-type region, and equations (11) and (12) indicate the behavioral
decision undertaken by the immigrant sorting into, respectively, L-type or
H-type region. Both the location (g) and the behavioral (ω) decision are a
function of other variables that can be grouped as individual-specific char-
acteristics, Xi (i.e., immigrant’s age and age squared, education dummies
capturing whether the immigrant has less than 12 or more than 16 years
of education, a dummy variable for married and single, a dummy that sig-
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nifies if the immigrant is a full-time or a part-time worker, and dummies
for religion and race), group-specific characteristics, or contextual effects,
Yig (i.e., the average education of individuals in the host region), the social
interactions term, mig (i.e., the yearly average level of trust of individuals
living in the host region, or immigrants living in the host region, or im-
migrants living in the host region coming from the immigrant’s geographic
area), and the term capturing the difference in trustworthiness between
the host region and home country, dtrigr, which is ethnic-specific (r). In
adding this term, the paper follows the literature (Durlauf, 2002; Durlauf
and Fafchamps, 2005).7 Also, Jg measures the strength of social interac-
tions and determines, jointly with both the private and the random utility,
the presence of multiple equilibria and eventual social traps arising from
conformity to low-level equilibria. Thus, the presence of a sizeable J is a
necessary condition for the existence of multiple equilibria.
In addition, following the literature (Train, 2003; Buis, 2011), in the
estimation, I control for endogeneity of the social interactions terms by
including the unobserved heterogeneity correlated with it. I assume it is
normally distributed with standard deviation (σ) equal to 1. Because we
can think of unobserved heterogeneity as a weighted sum of all the un-
observed variables that are possibly correlated with the social interactions
term, the distributional assumption is reasonable. Also, I assume, as a
7To avoid reverse causality and endogeneity problems, I assume the difference in
trustworthiness is an objective indicator predetermined with respect to the immigrant’s
location decision. However, we also instrumented the difference in trustworthiness using
as instruments the weighted genetic distance between the United States and each eth-
nicity used by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), as well as the yearly family income of the
respondent when (s)he was 16 years old, averaged by ethnicity, obtained from the GSS.
Because the weighted genetic distance has an effect on economic development (Spolaore
and Wacziarg, 2009), we may assume the weighted genetic distance is correlated with
and can be used to instrument the difference in trustworthiness. At the same time, we
can assume it is not correlated with the error terms of individual decisions. The same
can be said for the other instrument. Then, a two-step procedure is applied: the sequen-
tial logit is run by adding the estimated residual from the regression as an additional
regressor (Heckman, 1979), and standard errors have been bootstrapped. The results do
not significantly change.
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baseline scenario, the correlation (ρ) of unobserved heterogeneity with the
variable of interest is 0.25. I intentionally chose the correlation to be not too
high, because the unobserved variables may have either a positive or nega-
tive correlation with the variable of interest. Thus, assuming positive but
not too high correlation seems a natural choice. Given the distributional
assumption on unobserved heterogeneity, the models are estimated using
maximum simulated likelihood (MSL) due to the impossibility of getting
a closed-form solution (Train, 2003; Buis, 2011). A sensitivity analysis is
provided in Table 12. Furthermore, Table A.3 in the Appendix shows the
results are also robust to possible endogeneity of immigrants’ self-selection
into regions.
Therefore, the nonlinearity of the logit model, the intragroup and in-
tergroup variation in the data used, and the econometric framework just
described allow me to overcome the usual problems of social interactions
models (Manski, 1993; Moffitt, 2001; Brock and Durlauf, 2006).
3 Estimation Results
3.1 Actual Data
Table 1 reports trust averages of immigrants by country. In this table,
the entire GSS sample (1972-2014) has been used to get more observations
for each ethnicity. For each area and sub-population, the average trust of
immigrants sorting in either an L-type (left column) or an H-type (right
column) region is reported.8 The Wilcoxon-Mann-Withney test indicates
that only for some countries does the average trust of immigrants in L-
and H-type regions differ. However, the Kruskal-Wallis tests show we can
reject the null hypothesis of equal means across both areas of the world
8New England, East North Central, West North Central, Mountain, and Pacific are
classified as H-type regions; Middle Atlantic, South Atlantic, East South Central, and
West South Central are classified as L-type regions.
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and countries. Although little can be inferred from the table due to data
limitations and because we cannot compare the trust of immigrants before
and after migration, immigrants coming from the same place in L-type re-
gions have overall lower trust than immigrants from the same area sorting
in H-type regions. Also, overall trust is higher for immigrants coming from
countries with higher average trustworthiness. This finding provides a pre-
liminary descriptive evidence that immigrants’ trust may be influenced by
both inherited trust and social interactions.
To check this evidence further, I estimate a sequential logit model. From
now onward, the time span of the analysis is restricted to the years 1989-
2014. The estimation results on the whole sample always include a time
dummy for the years before and after 2000. This time dummy is not in-
cluded in the sub-sample analysis, because data limitations made obtaining
results for some of the groups of immigrants impossible. Thus, for the
sake of comparison, I have excluded it from all the sub-sample regressions.
This exclusion does not affect the final results. The regression analysis is
similar to the empirical framework in Alesina and La Ferrara (2002), who
analyze who trusts others in the United States; however, this paper differs
from their analysis. Indeed, this work focuses only on immigrants. Also,
it does not account for the presence of past traumas and for the logarithm
of the respondent income to avoid loss of data and representativeness. I
ran regression results including the logarithm of income, but it does not
significantly influence the decisions of immigrants, so its omission does not
alter the results. Also, this paper controls for the social interactions term
as well as for the difference in trustworthiness between the host region and
home country to capture the impact of both inherited trust and contempo-
raneous culture on immigrants’ decisions. In all the regressions, the average
marginal effects computed at the means for the location decision and the
behavioral decision in L-type and H-type regions are reported in columns
(1), (3), and (5), respectively. Columns (2), (4), and (6) report relative
standard errors robust to the heteroskedasticity. Table A2 (in Appendix
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Table 1: Sorting of immigrants in US regions
L-type H-type L-type H-type
regions regions regions regions
Country of origin Average trust Country of origin Average Trust
South America 0.094* 0.151* Poland 0.290 0.379
Africa 0.226 0.276 Russia 0.407 0.571
North Europe 0.386* 0.475* Lithuania 0.000 0.250
Austria 0.385 0.25 Ex-Yugoslavia 0.400 0.571
Denmark 0.333 0.400 Romania 0.363* 0.000*
UK 0.413 0.526 Asia 0.377 0.356
Finland na 0.80 China 0.487 0.437
Germany 0.284 0.400 Japan 0.600 0.348
Ireland 0.500 0.346 Philippines 0.188 0.217
Netherlands 0.429 0.438 India 0.371 0.429
Norway 0.200** 0.750** North America 0.292 0.250
Sweden 0.666 0.625 South Europe 0.290 0.274
Switzerland 1.000 na Greece 0.300 0.400
Belgium 1.000 1.000 France 0.500 0.400
East Europe 0.360 0.422 Italy 0.293 0.302
Czechoslovakia 0.200 0.400 Spain 0.273 0.147
Hungary 0.666 0.400 Portugal 0.000 0.273
Kruskal-Wallis test χ26 = 74.111 [0.000] χ
2+
6 = 115.868 [0.000]
(by area)
Kruskal-Wallis test χ232 = 110.839 [0.000] χ
2+
32 = 173.291 [0.000]
(by country)
Notes: Averages by immigrants sorting in low- or high-trust regions are reported. Low-
and high-trust regions are defined with respect to the yearly average level of trust. Ev-
ery pair of averages for immigrants sorting in low- and high-trust regions has been tested
to check for significant differences using a two-sample Wilcoxon ranksum Mann-Whitney
test. + indicates the Kruskal-Wallis (KW) statistics corrected for ties. p-values for the
KW statistics are in []. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *
Significant at the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey, years 1972-2014.
I) shows the results for the sequential logit model on actual data. Table 2
shows the results on the whole sample using simulated data. Indeed, given
the limited number of immigrants per region and year in the GSS data set,
and the sequential structure of the regression framework that reduces the
observations in the second stage, I simulate a data set that replicates the
raw data. Regional and ethnic representativeness are preserved and the
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characteristics of the variables match those of the raw data, but the num-
ber of observations is increased to get consistent results and to allow me
to run the sub-sample analysis. For the sake of brevity, only the results in
Table 2 are commented, because this is the regression on the whole sample
that should be related to the sub-sample analysis and because these results
are more consistent than the ones in Table A2. Also, the behavioral deci-
sions of immigrants in L-type and H-type regions in sections 3.2. and 4 are
explained together.
3.2 Results on the Whole Sample
Columns (1) and (2) of Table 2 report the results for immigrants’ location
decision. The results show females are less likely than men to emigrate to
an H-type region. Immigrants with lower education (i.e., less than 12 years)
are more likely to move to an H-type region than immigrants with inter-
mediate levels of education (the reference group), immigrants with higher
education (i.e., more than 16 years) are less likely to move to an H-type
region than the reference group. On average, education levels are higher in
H-type regions. Both married and single immigrants are more likely to sort
themselves (compared to the reference group, i.e., divorced, widowed, and
separated) into an H-type region. Immigrants who work part-time are more
likely to sort themselves into an H-type region compared to the ones with
other working statuses (i.e., retired, student, housekeeper, -temporarily-
unemployed) or immigrants working full-time. Blacks are less likely than
whites to join an H-type region: Because the majority of Afro-Americans in
the United States are concentrated in southern states (Rastogi et al., 2011),
and the H-type regions are mainly northern regions, black immigrants may
want to join regions where their ethnicity is more represented. Races other
than blacks are more likely than whites to sort themselves into an H-type
region. Immigrants with religious affiliations are less likely than immigrants
without to sort themselves into an H-type region. This result is expected,
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Table 2: Whole Sample and Global Social Interactions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age -0.01*** (0.001) 0.01*** (0.001) 0.00*** (0.001)
age2 0.00* (0.000) -0.00*** (0.000) -0.00*** (0.000)
female -0.09*** (0.005) -0.12*** (0.006) -0.03*** (0.003)
edu<12 0.18*** (0.006) -0.17*** (0.009) -0.04*** (0.004)
edu>16 -0.13*** (0.008) 0.26*** (0.007) 0.17*** (0.005)
educavg 0.24*** (0.008) -0.20*** (0.008) -0.02*** (0.004)
married 0.04*** (0.006) 0.05*** (0.007) 0.04*** (0.004)
single 0.08*** (0.008) 0.01 (0.010) -0.04*** (0.005)
ft 0.01 (0.006) 0.08*** (0.007) 0.02*** (0.004)
pt 0.06*** (0.009) -0.04*** (0.012) 0.07*** (0.005)
Black -0.30*** (0.012) -0.20*** (0.012) -0.02*** (0.008)
Other race 0.10*** (0.006) -0.12*** (0.007) -0.03*** (0.003)
Protestant -0.08*** (0.009) -0.16*** (0.011) 0.00 (0.005)
Catholic -0.05*** (0.008) -0.26*** (0.010) -0.10*** (0.005)
Jews -0.62*** (0.023) -0.14*** (0.018) -0.04*** (0.014)
Other religion -0.17*** (0.011) -0.13*** (0.012) 0.04*** (0.006)
2000 0.10*** (0.006) 0.07*** (0.008) 0.03*** (0.003)
dtr 0.15*** (0.021) -0.92*** (0.026) -0.33*** (0.012)
trustavg 6.32*** (0.059) 2.92*** (0.073) 1.10*** (0.029)
σ = 1; ρ = 0.25
observations 83,241
log-pseudolikelihood -78,324.72
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for, respectively, immigrants’ location decision, their behav-
ioral decision in L-type regions, and their behavioral decision in H-type regions. Columns
(2), (4), and (6) report the standard errors (in parentheses) for the respective choices.
Standard errors are obtained using the delta method and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2014, and author’s
calculations.
because the most religious states in the United States are located in the
south (e.g., Gallup, 2015) and many of the southern states are L-type re-
gions. On average, from 2000 onward, immigrants are more likely to sort
themselves into an H-type region, possibly due to the series of national and
international events that have occurred since 2000 that may have made H-
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type regions more attractive. Immigrants coming from countries for which
the difference in trustworthiness between host and home region is higher are
more likely to sort into H-type regions, probably because either they want
to improve their living or they want to live in a region where, after balanc-
ing for costs and benefits, they can more easily cheat (Butler, Giuliano and
Guiso, 2016). Finally, as expected, average trust in H-type regions is higher
than in L-type regions.
The results for the behavioral decisions on immigrants’ trust indicate
females are less likely than men to trust others and less educated immi-
grants are less likely than immigrants with intermediate levels of education
to trust, whereas immigrants with higher levels of education (16 years or
more) trust significantly more. These expected results are in line with
previous evidence (e.g., Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002). Immigrants living
in regions with higher levels of education are less likely to trust than im-
migrants living in regions with lower levels of education. Interpreting this
result may seem hard, but because average education is positively correlated
with trust, it is consistent with the literature (e.g., Ljunge, 2014) according
to which individuals can adapt more easily to lower levels of trust than to
high levels of trust because building trust takes longer than destroying it.
Married immigrants trust significantly more than the reference group (i.e.,
divorced, separated, or widowed) and single ones; singles trust significantly
less than the reference group in H-type regions. In both regions, full-time
workers are more likely to trust than the reference group, and part-time
workers trust significantly less (more) than the reference group in L-type
(H-type) regions. Blacks and other races are less likely to trust others than
whites, and this finding is also consistent with the previous literature that
indicates minorities, who have often been discriminated against, trust less
than others (Demaris and Yang, 1994; Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Put-
nam, 2007; Kumlin and Rothstein, 2010). Religious immigrants trust less
than immigrants with no religious affiliation in L-type regions; Jews and
Catholics (immigrants with other religion) are less (more) likely to trust
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others than immigrants with no religion in H-type regions. This finding
supports the theory that trust is lower in countries (and individuals) prac-
ticing some religion (Harrison, 2008). Since 2000, immigrants sorting into
both regions are more likely to trust others than immigrants that joined
a region before then, although the estimated parameter is not very high,
especially in H-type regions. Although additional investigation is required,
the slightly higher impact of the 2000 dummy on the behavioral decision
of immigrants in L-type regions may be interpreted as follows. On the
one hand, the effect of globalization could have increased the probability
of immigrants trusting others in the United States; on the other hand, the
negative international and US shocks (e.g., the 9/11 attack and the finan-
cial crisis) may have had a greater negative effect on the trust of individuals
in H-type regions than in L-type regions because, for instance, individuals
living in L-type regions may invest less in the financial markets (see, e.g.,
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales, 2004), so they have not been directly affected
by the financial crisis, or because they are likely to live in regions of the
United States far away from where the attack took place. Immigrants for
which the difference in trustworthiness between the host region and home
country is bigger are less likely to trust others everywhere, which suggests
immigrants coming from countries with comparatively (with respect to the
host region) lower average trustworthiness are less likely to trust others.
Finally, the social interactions term has a positive and very large impact:
immigrants are influenced by (their expectations about) the average trust
of individuals living in the region into which they sort themselves.
Overall, the results support the presence of significant sorting of immi-
grants. Furthermore, inherited trust influences their trusting decisions, and
the social interactions terms suggest overall cultural assimilation.
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4 Sub-sample Analysis
Given the well-known differences in trust across ethnicities, performing a
sub-sample analysis is worthwhile. Tables 3 to 8 replicate the same analysis
of Table 2 on sub-samples of immigrants by ethnicity, so that I can inves-
tigate differences in both sorting and trust behavior of immigrants coming
from different areas of the world. I find controlling for some ethnic or reli-
gious dummies for some sub-samples is more important than for others, but
controlling for the same variables, when possible, allows a greater degree of
comparability across the results. For the sake of brevity, although I present
the full set of results, I only provide comments for the variables of interest.
Table 3 reports the results for the African sub-sample.9 Both inherited
trust and contemporaneous culture are important to explain immigrants’
decisions. In particular, the higher the difference in trustworthiness between
the host region and home country, the more likely immigrants are to sort
themselves into L-type regions (column (1)), suggesting the presence of
positive sorting. Furthermore, as columns (3) and (5) show, this variable
plays a negative role in immigrants’ trust, indicating African immigrants
who inherited lower levels of trustworthiness (compared to the host region
they joined) are less likely to trust others, as suggested by the previous
literature. Finally, the social interactions terms are strongly significant in
both L-type and H-type regions, although the estimated parameter is very
sizeable only for the L-type regions, which may suggest that for African
immigrants, fully conforming to high levels of trust is difficult, whereas
conformity is easier for lower levels of trust. The results are consistent
with the aforementioned theory that conforming to high levels of trust is
more difficult (Ljunge, 2014) and that homophily may play a role in the
integration of African immigrants, because the social interactions term is
larger in regions with a higher percentage of African-Americans (L-type
9Dummies for Protestant and Jews have been dropped because only a few African
individuals in the sample belong to these categories.
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Table 3: Africans and Global Social Interactions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age 0.00*** (0.002) 0.01** (0.002) -0.00 (0.000)
age2 -0.00*** (0.000) -0.00 (0.000) -0.00 (0.000)
female -0.05*** (0.011) -0.09*** (0.014) -0.00 (0.002)
edu<12 0.06*** (0.014) -0.03 (0.019) -0.02*** (0.005)
edu>16 -0.09*** (0.017) 0.12*** (0.017) 0.00 (0.003)
educavg 0.27*** (0.116) 0.04*** (0.016) -0.03*** (0.007)
married 0.03** (0.014) -0.03 (0.018) 0.01** (0.003)
single -0.06*** (0.018) 0.03 (0.020) -0.00 (0.003)
ft -0.09*** (0.012) -0.05*** (0.015) -0.02 (0.004)
pt 0.03 (0.019) -0.11*** (0.030) -0.03*** (0.008)
Black -0.06*** (0.014) 0.03* (0.016) 0.02*** (0.005)
Other race 0.04*** (0.013) -0.05*** (0.018) -0.01*** (0.003)
Catholic 0.02* (0.012) -0.13*** (0.015) -0.00 (0.002)
Other religion 0.04** (0.018) -0.11*** (0.026) 0.02*** (0.005)
dtr -2.02*** (0.198) -2.31*** (0.257) -0.14*** (0.046)
trustavg 3.96*** (0.213) 2.93*** (0.274) 0.57*** (0.104)
σ = 1; ρ = 0.25
observations 5,128
log-pseudolikelihood -4,155.86
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for, respectively, immigrants’ location decision, their behav-
ioral decision in L-type regions, and their behavioral decision in H-type regions. Columns
(2), (4), and (6) report the standard errors (in parentheses) for the respective choices.
Standard errors are obtained using the delta method and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2014, and author’s
calculations.
regions).
Table 4 reports the regression results for immigrants coming from North-
ern European countries. Northern Europeans with comparatively lower lev-
els of inherited trust are more likely to join H-type regions, suggesting the
presence of significant negative sorting of these groups of immigrants. Re-
garding the behavioral decisions, columns (3)-(6) show Northern European
immigrants with comparatively lower levels of inherited trust are less likely
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Table 4: Northern Europeans and Global Social Interactions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age -0.00 (0.002) 0.02*** (0.003) 0.01*** (0.002)
age2 -0.00 (0.000) -0.00*** (0.000) -0.00** (0.000)
female -0.07*** (0.012) -0.11*** (0.014) -0.05*** (0.010)
edu<12 0.18*** (0.015) -0.13*** (0.020) -0.09*** (0.014)
edu>16 -0.07*** (0.016) 0.29*** (0.018) 0.29*** (0.015)
educavg 0.67*** (0.023) -0.12*** (0.019) 0.11*** (0.013)
married 0.11*** (0.015) 0.02 (0.018) 0.13*** (0.013)
single 0.22*** (0.020) 0.03 (0.023) -0.02 (0.016)
ft -0.03** (0.013) 0.08*** (0.016) -0.05*** (0.011)
pt 0.11*** (0.021) 0.00 (0.027) 0.07*** (0.016)
Black -0.25*** (0.029) -0.39*** (0.031) -0.02 (0.028)
Other race 0.05*** (0.014) -0.17*** (0.017) -0.10*** (0.012)
Protestant -0.13*** (0.018) -0.27*** (0.024) 0.00 (0.014)
Catholic -0.10*** (0.018) -0.35*** (0.024) -0.26*** (0.015)
Jews -0.60*** (0.054) -0.27*** (0.045) -0.15*** (0.049)
Other religion -0.15*** (0.025) -0.22*** (0.029) -0.03 (0.020)
dtr 0.12** (0.056) -0.85*** (0.086) -0.44*** (0.044)
trustavg 8.96*** (0.168) 2.61*** (0.146) 1.43*** (0.115)
σ = 1; ρ = 0.25
observations 18,245
log-pseudolikelihood -17,236.84
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for, respectively, immigrants’ location decision, their behav-
ioral decision in L-type regions, and their behavioral decision in H-type regions. Columns
(2), (4), and (6) report the standard errors (in parentheses) for the respective choices.
Standard errors are obtained using the delta method and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2014, and author’s
calculations.
to trust others and can easily conform to the average level of trust, disre-
garding the type of region into which they sort themselves. These findings
suggest inherited trust is important in explaining Northern European immi-
grants’ trust and that they can easily integrate. Because these immigrants
come from countries with high average trust and trustworthiness, their con-
formity to high levels of trust is intuitive. At the same time, however, they
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may also adjust to low averages of L-type regions, perhaps after they have
been cheated (Butler, Giuliano and Guiso, 2016).
The results for Southern Europeans (Table 5) indicate the presence of
positive sorting (columns (1) and (2)) for this group of immigrants. As far
Table 5: Southern Europeans and Global Social Interactions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age -0.00** (0.002) 0.00 (0.003) 0.01** (0.002)
age2 -0.00 (0.000) 0.00 (0.000) -0.00** (0.000)
female -0.10*** (0.013) -0.10*** (0.016) -0.08*** (0.012)
edu<12 0.19*** (0.015) -0.24*** (0.025) 0.02 (0.014)
edu>16 -0.14*** (0.018) 0.13*** (0.019) 0.22*** (0.019)
educavg 0.30*** (0.017) -0.17*** (0.019) -0.15*** (0.015)
married 0.03* (0.015) 0.01 (0.019) 0.10*** (0.015)
single 0.08*** (0.019) -0.05* (0.027) -0.04** (0.019)
ft 0.08*** (0.014) 0.11*** (0.018) 0.05*** (0.013)
pt 0.10*** (0.025) 0.02 (0.033) 0.13*** (0.022)
Black -0.31*** (0.035) -0.31*** (0.036) -0.07 (0.043)
Other race 0.04*** (0.014) -0.19*** (0.019) 0.01 (0.013)
Protestant -0.01 (0.021) -0.24*** (0.026) -0.01 (0.019)
Catholic 0.06*** (0.018) -0.25*** (0.022) -0.05*** (0.017)
Other religion 0.01 (0.025) -0.22*** (0.033) 0.11*** (0.024)
dtr -1.60*** (0.102) -2.09*** (0.139) -0.07 (0.089)
trustavg 6.76*** (0.154) 4.55*** (0.193) 0.45*** (0.153)
σ = 1; ρ = 0.25
observations 11,190
log-pseudolikelihood -10,387.96
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for, respectively, immigrants’ location decision, their behav-
ioral decision in L-type regions, and their behavioral decision in H-type regions. Columns
(2), (4), and (6) report the standard errors (in parentheses) for the respective choices.
Standard errors are obtained using the delta method and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2014, and author’s
calculations.
as the behavioral decision is concerned (columns (3)-(6)), although inher-
ited trust has a negative impact on the decision to trust others in L-type
regions, it is insignificant when explaining the trust of Southern European
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immigrants in H-type regions. In addition, the social interactions terms are
both strongly significant, but the impact is higher in southern regions, sug-
gesting they can conform to lower levels of trust, but less so to higher levels
of trust (Ljunge, 2014). Table 6 reports the results for the Eastern Euro-
Table 6: Eastern Europeans and Global Social Interactions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age -0.00 (0.003) 0.01** (0.004) -0.00** (0.002)
age2 -0.00 (0.000) -0.00 (0.000) 0.00** (0.000)
female -0.06*** (0.018) -0.13*** (0.022) -0.04*** (0.013)
edu<12 0.14*** (0.022) -0.29*** (0.038) -0.04* (0.019)
edu>16 -0.09*** (0.023) 0.33*** (0.026) 0.10*** (0.016)
educavg 0.10*** (0.022) 0.12*** (0.028) 0.06*** (0.013)
married -0.02 (0.021) 0.09*** (0.027) 0.10*** (0.016)
single -0.03 (0.029) -0.01 (0.038) 0.05** (0.020)
ft 0.08*** (0.019) 0.00 (0.023) -0.00 (0.014)
pt -0.02 (0.031) -0.11*** (0.040) 0.08*** (0.020)
Black -0.32*** (0.034) -0.29*** (0.035) -0.15*** (0.025)
Other race 0.08*** (0.019) -0.16*** (0.026) -0.07*** (0.014)
Protestant -0.08** (0.032) 0.00 (0.042) -0.09*** (0.021)
Catholic -0.02 (0.030) -0.03 (0.040) -0.12*** (0.019)
Jews -0.57*** (0.047) 0.11** (0.050) -0.00 (0.039)
Other religion -0.23*** (0.035) 0.08* (0.044) -0.02 (0.022)
dtr 1.60*** (0.169) -1.65*** (0.203) -0.97*** (0.142)
trustavg 4.92*** (0.208) 1.42*** (0.235) 2.07*** (0.138)
σ = 1; ρ = 0.25
observations 7,036
log-pseudolikelihood -7,264.06
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for, respectively, immigrants’ location decision, their behav-
ioral decision in L-type regions, and their behavioral decision in H-type regions. Columns
(2), (4), and (6) report the standard errors (in parentheses) for the respective choices.
Standard errors are obtained using the delta method and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2014, and author’s
calculations.
pean immigrants. The location decision (columns (1) and (2)) suggests the
presence of negative sorting of this group of immigrants. Both behavioral
decisions (columns (3)-(6)) indicate Eastern European immigrants who in-
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herited comparatively lower average trustworthiness are less likely to trust
others, and that they can integrate, disregarding the type of region. Thus,
although Eastern Europeans are among immigrants that are more likely to
experience segregation in the United States (Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor,
2008), the results suggest they can (or want to) easily conform to any type
of trust.
The findings for immigrants from Asia are presented in Table 7. They
Table 7: Asians and Global Social Interactions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age -0.00* (0.002) 0.01** (0.003) 0.01*** (0.002)
age2 0.00 (0.000) -0.00* (0.000) -0.00*** (0.000)
female -0.07*** (0.010) -0.10*** (0.015) -0.07*** (0.010)
edu<12 0.15*** (0.013) -0.18*** (0.023) -0.06*** (0.013)
edu>16 -0.11*** (0.014) 0.37*** (0.018) 0.26*** (0.014)
educavg 0.11*** (0.015) -0.34*** (0.016) 0.06*** (0.014)
married 0.02* (0.013) 0.17*** (0.021) -0.02 (0.012)
single 0.01 (0.016) 0.09*** (0.025) -0.14*** (0.016)
ft 0.05*** (0.012) 0.14*** (0.017) 0.10*** (0.012)
pt 0.09*** (0.017) 0.12*** (0.027) 0.17*** (0.016)
Black -0.29*** (0.025) -0.29*** (0.033) -0.14*** (0.031)
Other race 0.08*** (0.010) -0.01 (0.016) 0.02 (0.010)
Protestant -0.07*** (0.017) -0.28*** (0.026) -0.00 (0.015)
Catholic -0.05*** (0.015) -0.36*** (0.025) -0.15*** (0.014)
Jews -0.52*** (0.036) -0.42*** (0.046) -0.10** (0.043)
Other religion -0.17*** (0.019) -0.27** (0.027) 0.07*** (0.017)
dtr 0.25*** (0.028) -0.64*** (0.042) -0.31*** (0.025)
trustavg 4.20*** (0.092) 1.56*** (0.134) -0.24** (0.113)
σ = 1; ρ = 0.25
observations 17,536
log-pseudolikelihood -18,890.44
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for, respectively, immigrants’ location decision, their behav-
ioral decision in L-type regions, and their behavioral decision in H-type regions. Columns
(2), (4), and (6) report the standard errors (in parentheses) for the respective choices.
Standard errors are obtained using the delta method and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2014, and author’s
calculations.
show (columns (1) and (2)) the presence of significant sorting of Asian im-
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migrants. Also, the difference in trustworthiness has a negative impact on
immigrants’ trust. Note that, although they can easily conform to the lev-
els of trust in L-type regions, and the estimated parameter is also high,
the social interactions term has a negative impact on trust in H-type re-
gions. This result supports the theory explained above about the difficulty
of building social capital (Ljunge, 2014). However, it goes a step further:
Although further investigation is needed, it may suggest that when indi-
viduals have lower levels of trust or have been previously exposed to low
levels of trust, they may be skeptical of too-high levels of trust, so they
may behave counter-intuitively. For example, they may not trust others if
they notice the average trust of individuals living in a region is too high
compared to the level of trust they experienced in their own country. Fur-
thermore, the estimated parameter is not very high, indicating once again
they are not as influenced as immigrants coming from other areas of the
world by the average level of trust of individuals living in H-type regions.
This result could be related to the segregation and isolation this group of
immigrants experiences in the United States (Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor,
2008). By contrast, the social interactions term in L-type regions is very
high, significant, and positive.
Finally, Table 8 reports the results for American immigrants. Northern
and Southern Americans had to be pulled together due to data limitation,
so this pooling limits the possibility of disentangling the behavior of these
two types of immigrants; however, we control for a dummy variable for
Southern Americans. The results show the presence of negative sorting of
American immigrants. Furthermore, the difference in trustworthiness has
a negative impact on trust, and the social interactions terms in both L-
type and H-type regions are significant and positive, indicating American
immigrants adjust to the average level of trust of the host region. However,
although the estimated parameter is sizeable for the L-type regions, it is
lower for the estimation results in H-type regions, supporting the previous
findings. Thus, all in all, the results indicate immigrants behave differently
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Table 8: Americans and Global Social Interactions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age -0.01*** (0.002) 0.00*** (0.001) 0.00*** (0.000)
age2 0.00*** (0.000) -0.00* (0.000) -0.00 (0.000)
female -0.11*** (0.011) -0.09*** (0.007) -0.01*** (0.002)
edu<12 0.17*** (0.012) -0.05*** (0.008) -0.01*** (0.003)
edu>16 -0.15*** (0.020) 0.11*** (0.009) 0.05*** (0.004)
educavg 0.04* (0.020) -0.08*** (0.009) -0.02*** (0.004)
married 0.03** (0.015) 0.03*** (0.008) 0.01*** (0.003)
single 0.13*** (0.017) -0.00 (0.011) -0.01** (0.003)
ft -0.05*** (0.012) 0.02*** (0.007) 0.02*** (0.003)
pt -0.00 (0.019) -0.08*** (0.014) 0.03*** (0.004)
Afro-A. -0.13*** (0.028) -0.03** (0.012) -0.01 (0.005)
Other race 0.15*** (0.012) -0.03*** (0.007) -0.00* (0.002)
Protestant -0.09*** (0.021) -0.04*** (0.011) -0.00 (0.003)
Catholic -0.08*** (0.019) -0.12*** (0.012) -0.03*** (0.003)
Jews -0.33*** (0.063) -0.05** (0.023) 0.02** (0.009)
Other rel. -0.25*** (0.027) -0.03** (0.012) 0.01*** (0.004)
South A. 0.18*** (0.032) 0.07*** (0.013) 0.01* (0.006)
dtr 0.55*** (0.110) -0.71*** (0.061) -0.06*** (0.018)
trustavg 8.77*** (0.146) 1.45*** (0.119) 0.46*** (0.023)
σ = 1; ρ = 0.25
observations 24,106
log-pseudolikelihood -14,601.57
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for, respectively, immigrants’ location decision, their behav-
ioral decision in L-type regions, and their behavioral decision in H-type regions. Columns
(2), (4), and (6) report the standard errors (in parentheses) for the respective choices.
Standard errors are obtained using the delta method and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2014, and author’s
calculations.
in both sorting and trust decisions.
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5 Alternative Measures of Social Interactions
and Robustness Checks
5.1 Alternative Measures of Social Interactions
So far we have assumed immigrants are influenced only by what they think
is the average trust of all the individuals living in their region. Nonetheless,
as the previous literature (Tabellini, 2008a) notes, in countries endowed
with lower average trustworthiness, the spread of trust is circumscribed to
a generally small community (friends or the family), whereas opportunistic
behavior is allowed toward the rest of a society. This attitude may prevent
immigrants from such countries to conform to the average level of trust of
all individuals living in a region where they are less integrated and feel less
part of a whole society. If this theory holds, the more likely scenario is that
(some) immigrants interact with other immigrants and base their decision of
whether to trust on their beliefs about the average trust of other immigrants.
Even more realistic is the assumption that their decision to trust others
depends on what they think is the average trust of the immigrants living in
their region who came from their same area of the world. I thus replicate the
analysis of Tables 2-8, keeping as social interactions term either the (belief
about the) yearly average trust of immigrants living in a region (trustimmig,
Table 9), or the (belief about the) yearly average trust of immigrants coming
from the same region of the world (trustworld, Table 10) and now living in
a same host region, which can both represent the propensity of immigrants
to cultural segregation. For the sake of exposition, once again, I report
and comment on only the results for the difference in trustworthiness and
the social interactions terms for the three transitions because they are the
variables of greater interest.
Tables 9 and 10 show that, disregarding the sample analyzed, when
differences in trustworthiness are higher, immigrants prefer to sort into H-
type regions, and the average trust of immigrants is overall higher in L-type
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regions. This finding confirms that integration of immigrants is more likely
to happen in L-type regions. Regarding the behavioral decision, Table
9 suggests all sub-samples of immigrants are positively and significantly
influenced by the average trust of other immigrants, and that trust of other
immigrants has a larger impact on the behavior decision in L-type regions
than in H-type regions. Most of the estimated parameters are above unity,
and all the social interactions terms (except for American immigrants) are
higher in L-type regions than in H-type regions. Results in Table 10 have
a similar interpretation.
Regarding the behavioral decisions of each sub-sample of immigrants,
overall (whole sample), immigrants conform more to the average level of
trust of all individuals in a region (Table 2) than to the average level of
trust of other (similar) immigrants (Tables 9 and 10).
However, findings may vary by sub-sample. In comparing Table 3 and
9,10 we see African immigrants are more likely to conform to the average
level of trust than to the average level of immigrants, and this finding is
true for both types of regions. By contrast, Northern Europeans (Tables
4, 9 and 10) conform similarly to the three levels of social interactions: All
the social interactions terms are strong and significant in the three tables.
This result provides further evidence of the tendency of immigrants coming
from Northern European countries to easily integrate(Ljunge, 2014; But-
ler, Giuliano and Guiso, 2016). Findings in Tables 5, 9, and 10, suggest
Southern European immigrants are likely to be influenced by both trust of
immigrants and similar immigrants. However, a comparison of the three
tables suggests that, once again, individuals coming from countries with
lower average trustworthiness can easily adapt to lower levels of trust, but
in regions where trust is high, they may experience more difficulty and end
up conforming more to the behavior of other immigrants than to the behav-
ior of the whole society (Ljunge, 2014). Furthermore, they seem to conform
10For the African sample, estimating the model in Table 10 has been impossible due
to the lack of variability in the data.
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Table 9: All Samples and Immigrants’ Social Interactions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Whole Sample
dtr 0.90*** (0.019) -0.51*** (0.020) -0.30*** (0.014)
trustimmig -0.47*** (0.015) 1.29*** (0.023) 0.70*** (0.015)
Africa
dtr 2.04*** (0.109) -0.16 (0.097) -0.05** (0.022)
trustimmig -0.19*** (0.042) 0.97*** (0.059) 0.10*** (0.027)
Northern Europe
dtr 1.60*** (0.049) -0.78*** (0.082) -0.48*** (0.55)
trustimmig -0.63*** (0.028) 1.75*** (0.052) 1.66*** (0.053)
Southern Europe
dtr 2.18*** (0.077) 0.06 (0.111) -0.33*** (0.080)
trustimmig -0.18*** (0.034) 1.61*** (0.075) 0.71*** (0.040)
Eastern Europe
dtr 4.46*** (0.131) -1.12*** (0.175) 0.26** (0.111)
trustimmig 0.03 (0.055) 1.79*** (0.135) 0.72*** (0.037)
Asia
dtr 0.45*** (0.025) -0.49*** (0.039) -0.27*** (0.025)
trustimmig -0.67*** (0.033) 1.06*** (0.057) 0.41*** (0.043)
Americas
dtr 4.37*** (0.085) -0.07** (0.029) -0.07** (0.029)
trustimmig -1.07*** (0.040) 0.24*** (0.016) 0.29*** (0.020)
σ = 1; ρ = 0.25
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for, respectively, immigrants’ location decision, their behav-
ioral decision in L-type regions, and their behavioral decision in H-type regions. Columns
(2), (4), and (6) report the standard errors (in parentheses) for the respective choices.
Standard errors are obtained using the delta method and are robust to heteroskedastic-
ity. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the
10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2014, and author’s
calculations.
more to the trust of other immigrants than to the trust of other similar
immigrants. This may happen if the radius of trust is so small (Tabellini,
2008a) that also similar immigrants not belonging to the circle of family and
friends are treated opportunistically. This result is also consistent with find-
ings that show people of various ethnic backgrounds may trust other races
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Table 10: All Samples and Similar Immigrants’ Social Interactions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Whole Sample
dtr 0.91*** (0.019) -0.21*** (0.020) -0.09*** (0.012)
trustworld -0.12*** (0.008) 1.13*** (0.017) 0.66*** (0.011)
Northern Europe
dtr 1.53*** (0.049) -1.10*** (0.092) -0.33*** (0.057)
trustworld -0.16*** (0.018) 1.67*** (0.040) 1.17*** (0.030)
Southern Europe
dtr 2.24*** (0.076) 0.53*** (0.116) 0.06 (0.040)
trustworld -0.11*** (0.021) 1.26*** (0.042) 0.50*** (0.031)
Eastern Europe
dtr 4.73*** (0.131) -1.40*** (0.144) -1.85*** (0.223)
trustworld -0.36*** (0.026) 1.51*** (0.065) 1.52*** (0.097)
Asia
dtr 0.46*** (0.025) -0.63*** (0.045) -0.34*** (0.029)
trustworld -0.23*** (0.017) 1.74*** (0.048) 1.35*** (0.040)
Americas
dtr 4.12*** (0.084) 0.22*** (0.037) -0.04* (0.021)
trustworld -0.21*** (0.030) 0.38*** (0.031) 0.33*** (0.021)
σ = 1; ρ = 0.25
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for, respectively, immigrants’ location decision, their behav-
ioral decision in L-type regions, and their behavioral decision in H-type regions. Columns
(2), (4), and (6) report the standard errors (in parentheses) for the respective choices.
Standard errors are obtained using the delta method and are robust to heteroskedastic-
ity. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the
10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2014, and author’s
calculations.
and ethnicities less (including their own), especially in more diverse neigh-
borhoods (Putnam, 2007; Kumlin and Rothstein, 2010). Also, although the
difference in trustworthiness does not significantly explain trust of immi-
grants in L-type regions in Table 9 and in H-type regions in Table 10, it
still has a negative impact on the trust of Southern Europeans in H-type
regions. By contrast, it has a positive and significant impact on trust of
immigrants in L-type regions in Table 10.
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The results for the three tables (6, 9 and 10) are qualitatively similar for
Eastern European immigrants sorting into L-type regions, yet the results
are slightly different for immigrants in H-type regions: The difference in
trustworthiness has a positive impact in Table 9, indicating Eastern Euro-
pean immigrants coming from countries with comparatively lower average
trustworthiness are more likely to trust others. Also, they are influenced by
the average level of other immigrants in a region, but not as much as they
are influenced by the average level of trust of other individuals (Table 6) or
other similar immigrants (Table 10) in a region. This finding is consistent
with the literature (Putnam, 2007; Kumlin and Rothstein, 2010).
Results for Asian immigrants are interesting. Indeed, the difference in
trustworthiness indicates, in Tables 7, 9, and 10, that Asians coming from
countries with comparatively lower average trustworthiness are less likely
to trust others. The social interactions terms indicate Asian immigrants
in L-type regions are less likely to conform to the behavior of other immi-
grants (Table 9) than to the behavior of either all the individuals living in
a region (Table 7) or to other Asian immigrants (Table 10). In addition,
although they were negatively influenced by the average level of trust of
other individuals in H-type regions, the influence of trust of other similar
immigrants is positive and significant. In fact, a comparison of Tables 9
and 10 show they are more likely to conform to the behavior of other Asian
immigrants than to the behavior of other immigrants. This result shows
a tendency toward cultural segregation and is confirmed by the literature
(see Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor, 2008) as well as by the US reality, given
the presence of such neighborhoods as “Chinatown”.
Finally, Tables 8, 9, and 10 report the results for Americans. Americans
coming from countries with comparatively lower average trustworthiness
are less likely to trust others when the reference network includes other
immigrants (Table 9) and for H-type regions in Table 10. This term has
a positive impact on the trust of immigrants in L-type regions in Table
10. The social interactions terms are significant and positive, but not very
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large, indicating American immigrants are not very influenced by other
(similar) immigrants in their decisions to trust others. Instead, they are
more influenced by the average level of trust of other individuals in a region
when looking at immigrants in L-type regions.
In summary, the results are in line with findings that groups of immi-
grants who more differ culturally and racially from natives are more likely
to experience segregation (Cutler, Glaeser and Vigdor, 2008).
5.2 Sample Representativeness
I now perform robustness checks. The first check (reported in Table 11)
concerns the structure of the GSS data. One could argue that the GSS
Table 11: Robustness Checks (Whole Sample)-Representativeness
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(2004-2014)
dtr 0.02 (0.031) -0.68*** (0.028) -0.44*** (0.016)
trustavg 7.98*** (0.098) 2.65*** (0.111) 1.05*** (0.031)
(2004-2014)
dtr 1.01*** (0.027) -0.32*** (0.018) -0.44*** (0.019)
trustimmig -0.39*** (0.026) 0.81*** (0.034) 0.77*** (0.028)
(2006-2014)
dtr 1.04*** (0.029) -0.36*** (0.018) -0.44*** (0.020)
trustimmig -0.41*** (0.029) 0.87*** (0.035) 0.77*** (0.031)
σ = 1; ρ = 0.25
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for, respectively, immigrants’ location decision, their be-
havioral decision in L-type regions, and their behavioral decision in H-type regions.
Columns (2), (4), and (6) report the standard errors (in parentheses) for the respec-
tive choices. Standard errors are obtained using the delta method and are robust to
heteroskedasticity. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, *
Significant at the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 2002-2014, and au-
thor’s calculations.
data set has become representative of the US population since 2006, when
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Spanish speakers also started to be interviewed and included in the sample.
This drawback could put into question the results obtained in the analysis.
For this reason, I run the same analysis on the sample from 2006 to 2014
to check whether the social interactions terms maintain their significance.
Unfortunately, the reduced variability of the data does not allow me to ob-
tain results for the regressions in which immigrants are influenced by the
average trust of other individuals living in their region (first definition of
the social interactions term). The regression using this definition is feasible
only when we include the years from 2004 onward and drop the dummy
for Jews. Thus, we repeat the empirical analysis in Table 2 on the reduced
sample (2004-2014). The regression on the representative sample (2006-
2014), however, can be run when the social interactions term is the average
trust of immigrants. Hence, we report the results for both reduced samples
(2004-2014 and 2006-2014) using this definition. They show the social in-
teractions terms are still strongly significant, so we may conclude that as far
as the significance of the social interactions terms is concerned, the whole
sample is not significantly different from the representative sample. The
significance and the importance of the social interactions terms are main-
tained, so we can conclude the survey composition did not qualitatively
alter the results.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Finally, I perform a sensitivity analysis (Table 12). The models estimated so
far assume a positive and intermediate level (0.25) of correlation (ρ) between
unobserved heterogeneity and the social interactions term and unobserved
heterogeneity has standard deviation (σ) equal to 1. To check whether the
estimation results are biased due to the presence of unobserved heterogene-
ity, we perform a sensitivity analysis. Indeed, the presence of unobservables
may give rise to two phenomena, namely, the averaging mechanism and the
selection mechanism, arising from the necessity to model a stylized discrete
37
model.11 I hence estimate the models using different degrees of correlation
between unobservables and the regressors (Buis, 2011), as well as assum-
ing different standard deviations for the variable correlated with the social
interactions term. If the estimation results were sensitive, the presence of
unobserved heterogeneity would be a problem and would alter the results,
and in this case, the sensitivity analysis could be useful for understanding
the source of the problem. If the results were not sensitive to changing the
scenarios, we could conclude the presence of unobserved heterogeneity is not
a problem, as indicated by previous studies (e.g., Cameron and Heckman,
1998), for our framework.
Thus, assuming that the unobserved heterogeneity would represent, for
example, the transmission of cultural values from parents to children and
the individual willingness to pay for public goods, estimating the model
with 0.2 and 0.3 implies we are considering both individuals and societies
with low and high willingness to pay for public goods. Then the model is re-
estimated assuming alternative scenarios presented in Table 12. The results
are not qualitatively sensitive to changing scenarios, so we can conclude the
presence of unobserved heterogeneity is not a problem for the analysis. At
this point, note that although by performing a sensitivity analysis, find-
ings suggest changing assumptions about unobserved heterogeneity does
not alter the results, the cross-sectional empirical framework analyzed here
is somehow still subject to the critique by Cameron and Heckman (1998),
according to which single decisions made at a certain point (e.g., the lo-
cation decision and the behavioral decision) are the outcome of previous
11The averaging mechanism refers to the fact that estimating a model without mod-
eling the presence of unobserved heterogeneity is problematic because in a non-linear
model, the impact of the regressors on the averaged probability differ from their impact
on the probability (Cameron and Heckman, 1998; Allison, 1999). The selection mech-
anism, instead, refers to the possibility that a variable that is not problematic in the
first transition can become a confounding variable from the second transition due to the
self-selection process (Mare, 1980; Cameron and Heckman, 1998), because the decision
modeled is the final outcome of a dynamic process influenced by factors that could enter
the results but are omitted from the empirical model.
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Table 12: Sensitivity Analysis: Whole Sample and Global Social Interac-
tions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
σ = 0.5 ρ = 0.25
dtr 0.14*** (0.019) -0.78*** (0.022) -0.40*** (0.014)
trustavg 6.07*** (0.055) 2.32*** (0.062) 1.29*** (0.036)
σ = 0 ρ = 0.25
dtr 0.13*** (0.018) -0.73*** (0.020) -0.42*** (0.014)
trustavg 6.25*** (0.054) 2.31*** (0.058) 1.53*** (0.038)
σ = 1 ρ = 0.20
dtr 0.15*** (0.021) -0.92*** (0.026) -0.32*** (0.012)
trustavg 6.50*** (0.059) 3.10*** (0.073) 1.17*** (0.028)
σ = 1 ρ = 0.30
dtr 0.15*** (0.021) -0.91*** (0.026) -0.33*** (0.012)
trustavg 6.12*** (0.059) 2.73*** (0.072) 1.02*** (0.029)
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3), and (5) re-
port the marginal effects at the mean for, respectively, immigrants’ location
decision, their behavioral decision in L-type regions, and their behavioral de-
cision in H-type regions. Columns (2), (4), and (6) report the standard errors
(in parentheses) for the respective choices. Standard errors are obtained us-
ing the delta method and are robust to heteroskedasticity. *** Significant at
the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2014,
and author’s calculations.
experience. Thus, although controlling for unobserved heterogeneity may
take this into account, in this paper, identifying either all the historical
reasons that drive immigrants’ decisions (e.g. the influences of family ties
and networks in their home country), or checking whether their behavioral
decision is different from the behavior they used to have in their own coun-
try is impossible. This is beyond the scope of the present work, but it could
be investigated using a panel of immigrants.
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6 Conclusions
Understanding heterogeneities in the behavior of different immigrants is
crucial in countries such as the United States, where immigrants are of-
ten concentrated in some residential areas (e.g., “Chinatown” and “Little
Italy”), because residencial segregation of some ethnic groups can amplify
the presence and resilience of social segregation (e.g., conformity to the
behavior of similar immigrants and segregation with respect to the entire
population).
Using a sample of immigrants living in the Unites States, I estimate
a social interactions model of peer effects that models both sorting of im-
migrants in US regions and their decisions to trust others. In so doing, I
propose a framework to identify the social interactions in discrete choice
models that can be used to address other questions. After controlling for
the presence of significant self-selection in the sorting of immigrants, I study
the importance of different types of networks on the behavior of immigrants.
In addition, by repeating the analysis by sub-sample of immigrants, I in-
vestigate the presence of heterogeneities in behavior of different groups of
immigrants. Finally, the paper proposes a new strategy to assess the impor-
tance of both inherited and contemporaneous culture to explain individual
decisions.
The findings support the presence of significant sorting of immigrants
that should be taken into account and modeled to address selection bias.
Also, both the historical and the contemporaneous component of culture
have a large influence on immigrants. Furthermore, although overall cul-
tural assimilation of immigrants exists, the results vary by sub-sample of
immigrants, and sometimes they differ between the immigrants sorting into
H-type and L-type regions. In particular, I find that immigrants coming
from countries with lower levels of trustworthiness are more likely to trust
other immigrants than to conform to the average trust of an entire region
(i.e., segregation). By contrast, immigrants coming from countries with
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higher levels of trustworthiness (e.g., Northern Europeans) are more willing
to integrate.
Finally, the use of an observational learning model makes the model
appealing because it can be used for policy simulations and analysis. In-
deed, the paper provides an empirical framework that integrates economics
and sociology to explain and modify, through policy implementation, indi-
vidual behavior, which has to be encouraged (Brock and Durlauf, 2006).
Group-specific policies and government “price” policies (e.g., subsidies or
other instruments selectively assigned to one group; Moffitt, 2001) aimed at
changing expectations or fundamentals of subsets of immigrants (via inter-
ventions on mig, components of Xi and/or Yig) may help a society prevent
segregation, favor integration of immigrants, and avoid social traps. This
is important because the results, which are robust to additional checks and
to a sensitivity analysis, suggest different policies should be implemented,
for instance, to promote integration as well as a higher trust behavior of
different ethnic groups. Involving immigrants in social and civic activities,
increasing their average education, and incentivizing residentially mixed
groups are some examples of possible policies.
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A Appendix I
Table A1 reports the list of variables, definitions, and sources.
Table A1: List of Variables, Definitions, and Source
Variables Definition Source
age age of respondent (r henceforth) GSS
age2 age of r squared GSS
female dummy variable taking value 1 if r is female, 0 otherwise GSS
edu<12 dummy variable taking value 1 if r has less than 12 GSS
years of schooling, 0 otherwise GSS
edu>16 dummy variable taking value 1 if r has more than 16 GSS
years of schooling, 0 otherwise GSS
educavg yearly regional average years of education GSS
married dummy variable taking value 1 if r is married, 0 GSS
otherwise
single dummy variable taking value 1 if r is single, 0 GSS
otherwise
ft dummy variable taking value 1 if r works full-time, GSS
0 otherwise
pt dummy variable taking value 1 if r works part-time, GSS
0 otherwise
Black/ dummy variable taking value 1 if r is Black or GSS
Afro-A. Afro-American, 0 otherwise
Other race dummy variable taking value 1 if r’s is other than GSS
Afro-A. or White, 0 otherwise GSS
Protestant dummy variable taking value 1 if r is Protestant, 0 GSS
otherwise
Catholic dummy variable taking value 1 if r is Catholic, 0 GSS
otherwise
Jews dummy variable taking value 1 if r is Jew, 0 otherwise GSS
Other religion dummy variable taking value 1 if r’s religion GSS
is other than Protestantism Catholicism or Judaism,
0 otherwise
2000 dummy variable taking value 1 for years 2000-2014, GSS
0 otherwise
dtr difference in trustworthiness between host region GSS,
and home country computed using the yearly average WVS
trust on both the host region and home country
trustavg yearly average trust of all the r living in a region
trustimmig yearly average trust of r immigrants living in a region GSS
trustworld yearly average trust of r immigrants living in a region GSS
coming from the same geographic area of the world
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Table A2 reports the estimation results on the whole sample using actual
data.
Table A2: Actual Data and Global Social Interactions
Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
age -0.00 (0.007) 0.00 (0.009) 0.00 (0.005)
age2 -0.00 (0.000) 0.00 (0.000) -0.00 (0.000)
female -0.10*** (0.039) -0.06 (0.049) -0.03 (0.030)
edu<12 0.15*** (0.044) -0.20*** (0.067) -0.07* (0.037)
edu>16 -0.11** (0.053) 0.22*** (0.055) 0.15*** (0.038)
educavg 0.11** (0.049) -0.05 (0.058) -0.03 (0.037)
married -0.01 (0.047) 0.04 (0.060) 0.05 (0.036)
single -0.06 (0.065) 0.01 (0.083) 0.01 (0.053)
ft -0.07 (0.047) 0.06 (0.061) 0.02 (0.036)
pt 0.01 (0.065) 0.02 (0.085) 0.13*** (0.045)
Black -0.36*** (0.084) -0.07 (0.090) 0.01 (0.072)
other race 0.05 (0.040) -0.09 (0.054) -0.01 (0.030)
Protestant -0.04 (0.061) -0.08 (0.077) -0.00 (0.043)
Catholic -0.06 (0.058) -0.13* (0.078) -0.09** (0.042)
Jews -0.43*** (0.160) -0.12 (0.138) -0.11 (0.109)
other religion -0.16** (0.073) -0.09 (0.088) 0.03 (0.051)
2000 0.16*** (0.042) -0.02 (0.059) 0.02 (0.031)
difftrust 0.25 (0.156) -0.55*** (0.202) -0.22** (0.101)
trustavg 4.08*** (0.388) 1.26*** (0.447) 0.61** (0.272)
σ = 1; ρ = 0.25
observations 1,460
log-pseudolikelihood -1,551.81
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3), and (5) report the
marginal effects at the mean for, respectively, immigrants’ location decision, their behav-
ioral decision in L-type regions, and their behavioral decision in H-type regions. Columns
(2), (4), and (6) report the standard errors (in parentheses) for the respective choices.
Standard errors are obtained using the delta method and are robust to heteroskedasticity.
*** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2014.
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In Table A3, I report the estimation results on the whole sample using
actual data and control further for the presence of endogenous sorting of
immigrants into regions. Tables 9 and 10 already showed, by allowing cor-
relation between unobserved heterogeneity and the average level of trust of
immigrants, that the possible endogeneity of sorting of immigrants (coming
from the same area of origin of the immigrant making the decision) does
not affect, from an econometric point of view, the results. In this table, I
show that allowing for a further stage where individuals decide whether to
migrate, does not alter the results, thus controlling for the further possible
presence of endogeneity. Thus, individuals first decide whether to migrate,
and then immigrants decide where they want to migrate (in an L-type or
H-type region of the United States), and finally they decide whether to
trust others. So, the framework is identical to the one described in the
methodological section, with the addition of a further initial stage. These
two approaches offer different ways to control for the endogeneity of im-
migrants’ decisions.12 The results are reported in the following table and
can be interpreted similarly to the other tables of the paper. Note that the
results do not qualitatively change: The social interactions term is still high
and significant.
12I did not use this framework design in the main analysis, because the data are
cross-sectional and not panel data, and these three stage choices could be considered as
being constructed “ad hoc”. An analysis using dynamic panel data could eventually be
conducted using the econometric specification used in this table.
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Table A3: Actual Data and Global Social Interactions with endogeneous
sorting
Migration Decision Location Decision Behavioral Decision Behavioral Decision
(Migration Decision) (L-type regions) (H-type regions)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
age 0.00 (0.000) 0.00 (0.006) 0.00 (0.008) 0.00 (0.004)
age2 -0.00 (0.000) -0.00 (0.000) 0.00 (0.000) -0.00 (0.000)
female 0.00 (0.002) -0.09*** (0.033) -0.05 (0.042) -0.02 (0.021)
edu<12 0.02*** (0.002) 0.14*** (0.037) -0.16*** (0.061) -0.04 (0.027)
edu>16 0.01*** (0.002) -0.08* (0.046) 0.20*** (0.048) 0.11*** (0.028)
educavg 0.09** (0.042) -0.05 (0.051) -0.02 (0.027)
married 0.01*** (0.002) -0.00 (0.040) 0.04 (0.052) 0.04 (0.026)
single -0.01*** (0.003) -0.06 (0.054) 0.00 (0.072) 0.00 (0.038)
ft 0.00 (0.002) -0.06 (0.040) 0.06 (0.052) 0.01 (0.026)
pt -0.00 (0.003) 0.01 (0.055) 0.02 (0.074) 0.09*** (0.033)
Black 0.00 (0.003) -0.31*** (0.070) -0.06 (0.077) 0.01 (0.052)
other race 0.07*** (0.003) 0.11*** (0.033) -0.02 (0.047) 0.03 (0.021)
Protestant -0.02*** (0.003) -0.04 (0.052) -0.07 (0.066) -0.01 (0.030)
Catholic 0.01*** (0.003) -0.04 (0.049) -0.11 (0.067) -0.06* (0.030)
Jews 0.02*** (0.006) -0.35*** (0.135) -0.09 (0.120) -0.06 (0.077)
other religion 0.02*** (0.004) -0.12* (0.062) -0.06 (0.076) 0.03 (0.036)
2000 0.01*** (0.002) 0.14*** (0.038) -0.01 (0.051) 0.02 (0.022)
difftrust 0.22* (0.128) -0.47** (0.192) -0.15* (0.079)
trustavg 3.56*** (0.403) 1.12*** (0.414) 0.46** (0.205)
σ = 1; ρ = 0.25
observations 24,095
log-pseudolikelihood -6,182.20
Notes: Estimation Method: Sequential Logit. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) report the marginal effects at the
mean for, respectively, immigrants’ migration and location decision, their behavioral decision in L-type regions,
and their behavioral decision in H-type regions. Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) report the standard errors (in
parentheses) for the respective choices. Standard errors are obtained using the delta method and are robust to
heteroskedasticity. *** Significant at the 1% level, ** Significant at the 5% level, * Significant at the 10% level.
Source: General Social Survey and World Values Survey, years 1989-2014.
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